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<div>1. American Grand Strategy and National Security.-&nbsp;2. Before Primacy: American Grand Strategy from the Founding to “Manifest Destiny”.-&nbsp;3. Priming for Primacy: Building an” Empire of Principles” in the Progressive Era.-&nbsp;4.Primacy Deferred: American Grand Strategy from Wilson to FDR.-&nbsp;5. Primed for Primacy: American Grand Strategy and National Security during the Cold War.-&nbsp;6. Primacy in the Service of (Inter)national Security: The Promises and Pitfalls of the Unipolar Moment.-&nbsp;7. Primacy Constrained: Barack Obama and the Perils of Grand Strategic Under-reach.-&nbsp;8. Power without Primacy: Donald Trump and the Future of American Grand Strategy</div><div><br></div>

<p><b>Dr. Michael Clarke </b>is Senior Fellow at the Centre for Defence Research, Australian&nbsp;Defence College, and Visiting Fellow at the Australia-China Relations Institute,&nbsp;University of Technology Sydney, Australia.</p>

This book explains the grand strategic behavior of the United States from the Founding of the Republic to the Trump administration. To do so, it employs a neoclassical realist framework to argue that, while systemic change explains the broad evolution of US grand strategy, the precise shape and content of the grand strategies pursued has been conditioned by domestic political culture and interests. The book argues that distinct political cultures of statecraft (Hamiltonian, Jeffersonian, Jacksonian, and Wilsonian) have acted as permissive filters through which policy-makers have interpreted and responded to systemic stimuli, making some grand strategy choices more likely than others in the pursuit of national security. In particular, this book demonstrates that the American pursuit of primacy was facilitated by the predominance from the mid-19th century onward of the extroverted and vindicationist Hamiltonian and Wilsonian forms of statecraft, which reached a peak of influence at the end of the Cold War. The grand strategic overreach of the George W. Bush administration, however, stimulated the resurgence of the long dormant, introverted, and exemplarist Jeffersonian and Jacksonian forms of statecraft under the Obama and Trump administrations, respectively resulting in grand strategies of “decline management” and decline "denial." Ultimately, the return of exemplarist sentiment suggests a breakdown in elite consensus about the nature and purpose of American power in the 21st century.<div><br></div><div><p><b>Dr. Michael Clarke&nbsp;</b>is Senior Fellow at the Centre for Defence Research, Australian&nbsp;Defence College, and Visiting Fellow at the Australia-China Relations Institute,&nbsp;University of Technology Sydney, Australia.</p></div>

Presents a historically informed and conceptually rigorous account of the evolution of American grand strategy since 1945 Provides an explanation for the apparent disjuncture between the continued enduring material and strategic primacy of the United States and domestic and international perceptions of its decline through the application of neoclassical realist perspective Offers particular insights into, and alternative explanations for, the grand strategy approaches of the Obama and Trump administrations